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Abstract. The modularity offered by component-based systems made
it one of the most employed paradigms in software engineering. Precise
structural specification is a key ingredient that enables their verifica-
tion and consequently their reliability. This gains special relevance for
reconfigurable component-based systems.
To this end, the Grid Component Model (GCM) provides all the means to
define such reconfigurable component-based applications. In this paper
we report our experience on the formal specification and verification of
a reconfigurable GCM application as an industrial case study.
Keywords: Component-based Systems, Autonomous Systems, Formal
Methods, Reconfiguration, Model-Checking
1 Introduction
Meeting the demands of our modern society requires special care when designing
software. Applications are expected to be full-featured, performant and reliable.
Moreover, for distributed applications high-availability is also cause of concern.
Taming this complexity makes the use of modular techniques mandatory. To
this end, the modularity offered by component-based systems made it one of the
most employed paradigms in software engineering.
Embracing this approach enables structural specifications, thus leveraging
formal verification. This gains special relevance for reconfigurable component-
based systems. Indeed, while offering systems with an higher availability, the
ability to evolve at runtime inherently increases the complexity of an application,
making its formal verification a challenging task.
1.1 Context
This work occurs in the context of the Spinnaker project, a French collaborative
project between INRIA and several industrial partners, where we intend to con-
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tribute for the widespread adoption of RFID-based technology. To this end, our
contribution comes with the design and implementation of a non-intrusive, flexi-
ble and reliable solution that can integrate itself with other already deployed sys-
tems. Specifically, we developed the HyperManager, a general purpose moni-
toring application with autonomic features. This was built using GCM/ProAc-
tive1 — a Java middleware for parallel and distributed programming that follows
the principles of the GCM component model. For the purposes of this project,
it had the goal to monitor the E-Connectware2 (ECW) framework in a loosely
coupled manner.
For the sake of clarity let us describe one of the real life scenarios faced in
a industrial context. An hotel needs to keep track of the bed sheets used by
their customers. Every bed sheet used has an embedded RFID sensor chip that
uniquely identifies it. At every shift, the hotel maids go through all the rooms
recovering these bed sheets and putting them in a laundry cart. By reaching the
end of the rooms’ corridor, the laundry cart emits to another physical device
running the ECW Gateway software the bed sheets’ identifiers. For each corridor
there might be several laundry carts and one device running the ECW Gateway.
After receiving the bed sheets’ identifiers the ECW Gateways emit this informa-
tion along with their own identifier to yet another physical device running the
ECW Server. Once the information reaches the top of this hierarchy it can be
used to whatever purpose, namely bed sheets traceability.
Abstracting away this particular scenario, one can see it in a hierarchical
manner as depicted by Figure 1.
...
HyperManager Server
ECW 
Server
HyperManager Gateway
ECW 
Gateway
HyperManager Gateway
ECW 
Gateway
...
...
Rﬁd devices Rﬁd devices
Fig. 1. Hierarchical representation of our case study
Regarding the previously described scenario, this hierarchical view should
pose no doubt. For each of the n floors of the hotel there are m laundry carts
that communicate in a one-to-one style with a gateway. On the other hand, the
1 http://proactive.activeeon.com/index.php
2 http://www.tagsysrfid.com/Products-Services/RFID-Middleware
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gateways communicate with the server on a n-to-one style. Moreover, there is
also the need to cope for possible maintenance issues. For instance, in the case
of malfunction of some device running the ECW Gateway, it may be required to
replace it or add a new one in order to avoid any overloading.
The architecture depicted by Figure 1 also includes the HyperManager ap-
plication. Indeed, it is deployed alongside the pre-existent distributed system,
performing its monitoring on all ECW components. The careful reader will no-
tice that the flow of requests go both from the HyperManager Server to the
HyperManager Gateway, and vice-versa. Indeed, these follow the pull and push
styles of communication, respectively. More details regarding these mechanisms
will be discussed at a later stage.
1.2 Contributions
This paper discusses an industrial case study of a reconfigurable monitoring
application. On the one hand, it should be noted that we aim at real-life appli-
cations, indeed, our models go upto the intricacies of the middleware itself. This
has the direct consequence of promoting the use of formal methods within the
industry.
On the other hand, we go beyond previous work [5] by including reconfigu-
ration capabilities. This yields bigger state-spaces and inherently new issues to
deal with. Investigating the feasibility of such undertakings is within the scope
of this paper too. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work address-
ing the challenges of behavioural specification and verification of reconfigurable
component-based applications.
1.3 Organisation of the Paper
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives the main in-
gredients of our behavioural semantics for specifying GCM applications. Then,
Section 3 presents our general purpose monitoring application — The Hyper-
Manager. Section 4 details its simplified behavioural model, i.e. without sup-
port for structural reconfigurations, and its proven properties. The impact of
adding reconfiguration capabilities is discussed in Section 5. Related work is
discussed in Section 6. For last, Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 A Behavioural Semantics for GCM Applications
This section provides a brief overview of the behavioural semantics modelling
GCM/ProActive applications by relying on the pNets formalism. For the sake
of space we omit some of the underlying definitions. For a detailed account of
its intricacies the interested reader is pointed to [1].
As an illustrative example, the internals of a GCM primitive component
featuring three service methods — m1, m2 and m3 — and two client methods
— m4 and m5 — are depicted by Figure 2.
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Primitive Component Example
M1 M3
!Recycle m5(p5)
!Recycle m4(p4)
GetValue m4(p4, val)
Serve m*(fid∗, arg)
Queue PM m5
PM m4
Body
...
Call m*(arg)!R m1(fid1, val)
!R m2(fid2, val)
!R m3(fid3, val)
!R m*(fid∗)
!R *(val)
?Q m3(fid3, arg)
?Q m2(fid2, arg)
?Q m1(fid1, arg)
?R m5(p5, val)
?R m4(p4, val)
!Q m5(p5, arg)
!Q m4(p4, arg)
GetValue m5(p5, val)
New m5(p5)
G
e
tP
ro
x
y
m
*
New m4(p4)
Proxy m4[p4]
Proxy m5[p5]
Fig. 2. pNet representing a primitive component
Invocation on service methods — Q mi, i∈{1,2,3} — go through a Queue, that
dispatches the request — Serve m* — to the Body. Serving the request consists
in performing a Call m* to the adequate service method, represented by theMi
boxes in the figure. Once a result is computed, a synchronized R m* action is
emitted. This synchronization occurring between the service method and the
Body stems from the fact that GCM primitive components are mono-threaded.
Moreover, the careful reader will notice the fidi, i∈{1,2,3} in the figure. These
are called futures and act as promises for replies, leveraging asynchrony between
components.
Service methods interact with external components by means of client in-
terfaces. This requires obtaining a proxy — GetProxy m*, New mi, i∈{4,5} —
in order to be able to invoke client methods — Q mi, i∈{4,5}. The reply —
R mi, i∈{4,5} — goes to the proxy used to call the external component. Then,
a GetValue mi, i∈{4,5} is performed in order to access the result in the method
being served. Finally, Recycle mi, i∈{4,5} actions can be performed in order to
release the proxies.
The behaviour of the Queue and the Body elements should pose no doubt. The
former acts as priority queue with a First in, First Out (FIFO) policy, raising
an exception if its capacity is exceeded. The latter dispatches the requests to the
appropriate method and awaits its return, thus preventing the service of other
requests in parallel.
The handling of proxies however, is not as straightforward and deserves a
closer look. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the behaviour of the Proxies and Proxy
Managers, respectively. Upon reception of a New mi action, a Proxy waits for
the reply of the method invoked with it — R m —, making thereafter its result
available — GetValue m. The proxy becomes then available on the reception of
a Recycle m action.
The behaviour of the Proxy Manager is slightly more elaborated. This main-
tains a pool of proxies, keeping track of those available and those already al-
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Fig. 3. Behaviour of proxy
Fig. 4. Behaviour of the proxy
manager
located. On the reception of a GetProxy m action, it activates a new proxy
— New m — if there is one available. Should that not be the case, an Er-
ror(NoMoreProxy) action is emitted. As expected, a Recycle m action frees a
previously allocated proxy.
3 The HyperManager
The HyperManager is a general purpose monitoring application that was
developed in the context of the Spinnaker project3. The goal was to deliver a
modular solution that would be capable of monitoring a distributed application
and react to certain events. As such, the HyperManager is itself a distributed
application, deployed alongside the target application to monitor.
Generally, when performing a monitoring task in an application one may
consider two types of events: pull and push. The former stands for the usual
communication scenario where the request comes from the client and then re-
sponded by the server. The latter however, is when the server pushes data to
clients independently from a client’s request. Both styles of communication are
employed in the HyperManager application.
As illustrated by Figure 5, the server (composite) component of the Hyper-
Manager application features three primitive components that are responsible
for the application logic. Each possesses one or several service methods that
stand for their functionalities and are modelled by labelled transition systems
(LTSs).
The JMX Indicators component features only one service method: it accepts
requests about a particular JMX4 indicator and replies its status. This encap-
sulates business code and interacts directly with ECW.
3 Project OSEO ISIS. http://www.spinnaker-rfid.com/
4 JMX is the standard protocol used for monitoring Java applications.
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HyperManager Server
HMStartMonitoringMethod
HMStopMonitoringMethod
HMGatewayMulticastMethod
Pull Component
 JMXIndicatorsMethod
JMX Indicators
Server Primitive
HMServerMethod
Push Event
HMLoopMethod
Pull Event
Fig. 5. HyperManager server component
The Pull Component however, includes three service methods and four client
interfaces. As the component’s name indicates, it is responsible for pulling infor-
mation and emitting it as pull events. The service methods HMStartMonitoring-
Method and HMStopMonitoringMethod are responsible for starting and stopping
the pulling activity, respectively. Typically, these are the methods called by the
administrator. The remaining service method, HMLoopMethod, may pose some
doubt. Indeed, it is called from one of its own client’s interface. Being a ProAc-
tive application, it follows the active object paradigm where explicit threading is
discouraged. As such, making a method loop is achieved by making this method
sending itself a request before concluding its execution.
While in the monitoring loop, the HMLoopMethod method pulls information
regarding its own local JMX indicators and those of its gateways via a multi-
cast client interface. The last remaining client interface serves the purpose of
reporting the pulled information as pull events.
Last, the Server Primitive component receives push information from the HM
Gateways — typically to alert the occurrence of some anomaly — and emits it as
push events. In our implementation both push and pull events are then displayed
in some application with a graphical interface for administration purposes.
The description of the HyperManager’s gateway component follow the
same spirit. Figure 6 depicts its constitution.
It is also composed by three primitive components. As expected, the JMX
Indicators component has the same semantics as described above.
The Push Component features the same service methods as the Pull Compo-
nent. Its semantics however, are slightly different. While looping it will check for
the status of its JMX indicators, and communicate with the HyperManager
server if some anomaly is encountered — which will then trigger a push event.
As for the Gateway Primitive component, its sole purpose is to reply to the
pulling requests from HyperManager server.
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..
HyperManager Gateway
HMStartMonitoringMethod
HMStopMonitoringMethod
Push Component
 JMXIndicatorsMethod
JMX Indicators
Gateway Primitive
HMGatewayMethod
HMLoopMethod
HMServerMethod
Fig. 6. HyperManager gateway component
4 HyperManager’s Behavioural Model
Modelling the HyperManager in the behavioural semantics pNets [1] requires
us to provide a behaviour for each service method. In the following we illustrate
this by providing an user-version LTS for all of them — i.e. we omit all the
machinery involving futures and proxies. Moreover, for more material on this
case study the reader is invited to its companion website5.
Regarding our modelling and verification workflow, we build the behavioural
models by encoding the involved processes in the Fiacre specification language
[3]. Then, the flac compiler translates it to Lotos [4]. From there we can use
the CADP toolbox [9]. Typically, we use bcg open for state-space generation —
in conjunction with distributor if performing it on a distributed setting —, svl
scripts for managing state-space replication, label renaming and build products
of transition systems. For last, evaluator4 for model-checking the state-space
against MCL (Model Checking Language) [13] formulas — an extension of the
alternation-free regular µ-calculus with facilities for manipulating data.
To optimize the size of the model, the composite components have no request
queue and requests are directly forwarded to the targeted primitive component.
This has no influence in the system’s semantics as the primitives’ request queues
are sufficient for dealing with asynchrony and requests from the sub-components
are directly dispatched too. Moreover, we set the primitive components with
re-entrant calls with a queue of size 2, and the remaining of size 1.
4.1 The HM Gateway
The JMX Indicators primitive component only features one service method: JMXIndi-
catorsMethod. Its behaviour is modelled by Figure 7. For the sake of simplicity,
we only model two types of indicators: MemoryUsage and DeviceStatus. The lat-
ter takes into account an identifier, returning its availability status. This relates
5 http://www-sop.inria.fr/members/Nuno.Gaspar/HyperManager.php
8 N. Gaspar, L. Henrio, E. Madelaine
to the status of a RFID reader transmitting to the ECW Gateway. While the
former simply returns the stability status of the memory.
s_mem
s_init
Call_JMXIndicatorsMethod ? 
Memory_Usage
s_dev
Call_JMXIndicatorsMethod ? 
DeviceStatus(id)
R_JMXIndicatorsMethod ! 
 memory_usage(Stable)
R_JMXIndicatorsMethod ! 
 memory_usage(Unstable)
R_JMXIndicatorsMethod ! 
  device_status(Available, id)
R_JMXIndicatorsMethod ! 
  device_status(Unavailable, id)
Fig. 7. Behaviour of the JMXIndicatorsMethod
s1s_init
Call_GatewayMethod  ? args
s1
Q_JMXIndicatorsMethod ! args
s2
GetValue_JMXIndicatorsMethod ? reply
R_GatewayMethod ! jmx_reply
Fig. 8. Behaviour of the HMGate-
wayMethod
The service method offered by the Gateway Primitive component has also a
fairly simple behaviour. It is illustrated by Figure 8. It acts merely as a request
forwarder for the JMX Indicators component.
Regarding the Push Component, the HMStartMethod and HMStopMethod
methods enable/disable the looping process. This is achieved by a shared variable
among processes that acts as a flag. Invoking HMStartMethod will set the flag
variable started to true and perform an invocation to HMLoopMethod. On the
other hand, HMStopMethod will set the flag to false. Their behaviour is rather
trivial and therefore omitted for the sake of space. In practice, the involved labels
are GuardQuery, GuardReply?b:bool, SetFalse and SetTrue; their meaning should
be obvious from their names.
The last remaining service method to describe is the most interesting one —
the loop method.
s2
s1
s_init
Call_HMLoopMethod ?
R_HMLoopMethod !
[started]
s_stop
not [started]
s3
Q_JMXIndicatorsMethod ? jmx_args
s4
GetValue_JMXIndicatorsMethod ? jmx_reply
s7
R_HMLoopMethod !
[noAnomaly (jmx_reply)]
not [noAnomaly (jmx_reply)]s5
s6
Q_ServerMethod ! jmx_reply
Q_HMLoopMethod !
Fig. 9. Behaviour of the HMLoopMethod at the gateway level
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As illustrated by Figure 9, the actual looping only occurs if the flag variable
started is set to true, otherwise a simple return without performing any signif-
icant action is made.6 While looping, the JMX indicators are checked. Should an
anomaly be detected a report is made to the HM Server. Last, before returning
a request is sent to itself — Q HMLoopMethod — in order to be able to continue
looping while the flag variable evaluates to true.
Model Generation and Proven Properties Table 1 illustrates the relevant
information concerning the HM Gateway’s state-space built using the CADP
toolbox. The model is generated with two RFID readers.
States Transitions File Size
hmgateway.bcg 14.931.628 147.485.103 ∼ 295 mb
hmgateway-min.bcg 14.931.628 147.485.103 ∼ 296 mb
Table 1. Numbers regarding the gateway model
The entry suffixed by -min means that minimization by branching bisimu-
lation was applied. We note that the minimization process fails to produce a
reduced transition system. This is due to the fact that we do not hide any com-
munication action and all transitions are visible7. However, there is an increase
in the file size even though the number of states and transitions remained equal.
This is justified by the fact that bcg min inserts information in the produced file
stating that it came from a minimization process. In any case, this overhead is
rather negligible.
Having this state-space generated we can now prove some properties regard-
ing the expected behaviour of the model. Specifying properties of interest in
MCL is a rather intuitive task due to its expressiveness and conciseness. Its main
ingredients include patterns extracting data values from LTS actions, modali-
ties on transition sequences described using extended regular expressions and
programming language constructs.
For instance, one could wonder about this rather unusual looping mechanism.
Once setting the flag to true — accomplished by Q HMStartMethod —, the
looping continues until a request to stop monitoring is received. That is, there
is no path in which the flag evaluates to false without the occurrence of a
Q HMStopMethod.
Property 1. [ "Q_HMStartMethod" . "Q_HMLoopMethod" .
(not "Q_HMLoopMethod")* . "GuardReply !FALSE" ] false
6 For the sake of clarity, communications actions are written in black, while local
computations are written in blue. Their intended meaning should pose no doubt.
7 It is worth noticing that the flac compiler translates shared variables and internal
communications into τ -transitions. These will therefore disappear from the LTS if
subject to minimization.
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Naturally, we also want to avoid overloading the HM Server with unnecessary
messages. As such, we want to ensure that we cannot push data if not in the
presence of an anomaly. This can be modelled as follows:
Property 2.
[ ((not "R_JMXIndicatorsMethod !memory_usage (Unstable)")* .
"Q_ServerMethod.*") |
((not "R_JMXIndicatorsMethod !device_status ((Unavailable, IdTwo))")* .
"Q_ServerMethod.*") |
((not "R_JMXIndicatorsMethod !device_status ((Unavailable, IdOne))")* .
"Q_ServerMethod.*")
] false
Both properties are naturally proved true.
4.2 The HM Server
Similarly as seen for the HM Gateway component, the HM Server component also
features a JMX Indicators primitive component. This however, is naturally not
endowed with indicators for the RFID devices statuses. Technically, we attach
to the LTS modelling its behaviour (Figure 7) a context that constraints its
requests. Moreover, HMStartMethod and HMStopMethod methods exhibit the
same behaviour as described above.
As seen above, upon detection of an anomaly, the HM Gateway component
pushes the relevant information to the HM Server. Then, it is emitted as a push
event as depicted by Figure 10. The careful reader will notice that the emit-
ted event also contains the information regarding the HM Gateway from which
the anomaly originated. This should come as no surprise as there can be sev-
eral of them, and properly identifying the source of an abnormal situation is of
paramount importance.
As depicted by Figure 11, the looping process for the HM Server proceeds in
a similar fashion as the one from the HM Gateway: the flag variable started’s
valuation determines whether we enter the looping process or if we just return.
While looping we pull information from the local JMX indicators and emit it as
a pull event.
Moreover, via a multicast interface information is pulled from the connected
gateways. This, will emit as many pull events as the number of connected gate-
ways. Last, a request to itself is performed in order to continue looping.
Model Generation and Proven Properties Table 2 illustrates the relevant
information concerning HM Server’s state-space.
As in the case of the HM Gateway model, the minimization process failed to
produce a smaller state-space. However, this time we get a 9% increase in the
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s1
s_init
Call_ServerMethod_i ? server_args
s2
Push_Event ! 
  From_Gateway_i, server_args
R_ServerMethod_i !
Fig. 10. Behaviour of the HM-
ServerMethod
s2
s1
s_init
Call_HMLoopMethod ?
R_HMLoopMethod !
[started]
s_stop
not [started]
s3
Q_JMXIndicatorsMethod ? jmx_args
s4
GetValue_JMXIndicatorsMethod ? jmx_reply
s5
Pull_Event ! {FromServer, jmx_reply}
s6
Q_GatewayMulticastMethod ? gw_args
GetValue_GatewayMulticastMethod ? gmulti_reply
s7
[i < ACTIVE_Gateways]
Pull_Event ! origin, data
i++
s8
Q_HMLoopMethod !
R_HMLoopMethod !
not [i < ACTIVE_Gateways]
i := 0
origin, data := gmulti_reply[i]
Fig. 11. Behaviour of the HMLoopMethod at the
server level
States Transitions File Size
hmserver.bcg 12.787.376 187.589.422 ∼ 363 mb
hmserver-min.bcg 12.787.376 187.589.422 ∼ 396 mb
Table 2. Numbers regarding the server model
file size, not so much negligible as the increase noticed for the HM Gateway’s
state-space.8
A rather trivial property we can expect to hold is that we can reach a state
which explodes one of the request queues. This can be modelled in MCL as
follows:
Property 3. < true* . ’QueueException_ServerPrimitive !.*’> true
As mentioned above, we omitted all the machinery involving proxies while
describing the service methods’ behaviour. However, this is naturally included in
the generated model. For instance, the HMLoopMethod method needs to request
a proxy in order to be able to invoke JMX Indicators’s service method. This is
naturally encoded as follows:
Property 4. [ (not "GetProxy_JMXIndicatorsMethod.*")* .
"Q_JMXIndicatorsMethod.*"] false
As expected, both properties hold in the model.
4.3 System Product, Model Generation and Proven Properties
We attempted to generate a system product constituted by two HM Gateways
and one HM Server components. However, even on a machine with 90 GB of
RAM, we experienced the so common state-space explosion phenomena.
8 In fact, we encountered another peculiar situation where minimization pro-
duced a smaller state-space, yet a bigger file size: http://cadp.forumotion.com/
t374-bcg-file-size-after-minimization
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This arises often in the analysis of complex systems. To this end, commu-
nication hiding comes as an efficient and pragmatic approach for tackling this
issue. Indeed, it allows to specify the communication actions that need not to
be observed for verification purposes, thus yielding more tractable state-spaces.
Table 3 illustrates the effects of applying this technique to the model. The
sole communication actions being hidden are the ones involved in (1) the request
transmission from the Queue to the adequate method — Serve and Call —, (2)
the proxy machinery —GetProxy , New and Recycle —, and (3) finally in the
guard of the looping methods — GuardQuery, GuardReply, SetFalse and SetTrue.
States Transitions File Size
hmgateway-min-w-hidden.bcg 14.931.628 147.485.103 ∼ 287 mb
hmgateway-min-w-hidden-min.bcg 409.374 4.007.232 ∼ 8.5 mb
hmserver-min-w-hidden.bcg 12.787.376 187.589.422 ∼ 375 mb
hmserver-min-w-hidden-min.bcg 5.761.504 85.157.420 ∼ 179 mb
SystemProduct.bcg 342.047.684 3.026.114.393 ∼ 5.27 gb
SystemProduct-min.bcg 259.340.044 2.396.896.830 ∼ 4.83 gb
Table 3. Relevant numbers regarding the generated model
The lines suffixed by -hidden indicate the results obtained by hiding the
mentioned communication actions in the minimized HM Gateway and HM server
state-spaces. For both, no effect is noticed on the size of the LTS. However, there
is a decrease in the file size. This is due to the fact that the hiding process yields
several τ -transitions, which facilitates file compression. This has the consequence
of leveraging the subsequent minimization process. Indeed, we even obtain a
reduction by two orders of magnitude (!) for the HM Gateway state-space.
The HyperManager comes as a monitoring application that should be able
to properly trace the origin of an anomaly. As such, one behavioural property
that we expect to hold is that whenever an abnormal situation is detected by a
HM Gateway, it is fairly inevitable to be reported as a push event that correctly
identifies its origin.
First, we shall use MCL’s macro capabilities to help us build the formula:
macro GETVALUE_1_MEMORY () =
"GetValue_JMXIndicatorsMethod_Push_1 !memory_usage (Unstable)"
end_macro
macro PUSH_1_MEMORY () =
("Push_Event (FirstGateway, UnstableMemoryUsage)")
end_macro
...
The above macros should be self-explanatory. The former represents the detec-
tion of an anomaly coming from the first HM Gateway — the model is instan-
tiated with two HM Gateways, thus we differentiate their actions by suffixing
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them adequately. The latter stands for the emission of the push event corre-
sponding to that anomaly. The macros for the remaining relevant actions are
defined analogously.
Moreover, we define the following macro generically encoding the fair in-
evitability that after an anomaly the system emits a push.
macro FAIRLY_INEVITABLY_A_PUSH (ANOMALY, PUSH) =
[ true* . "ANOMALY" . (not "PUSH")* ]
< (not PUSH)* . PUSH > true
end_macro
Having the macros defined, we can now write the formula of interest:
Property 5.
(FAIRLY_INEVITABLY_A_PUSH(GETVALUE_1_MEMORY, PUSH_1_MEMORY) and
FAIRLY_INEVITABLY_A_PUSH(GETVALUE_2_MEMORY, PUSH_2_MEMORY) and
FAIRLY_INEVITABLY_A_PUSH(GETVALUE_1_DEVICE_1, PUSH_1_DEVICE_1) and
FAIRLY_INEVITABLY_A_PUSH(GETVALUE_1_DEVICE_2, PUSH_1_DEVICE_2) and
FAIRLY_INEVITABLY_A_PUSH(GETVALUE_2_DEVICE_1, PUSH_2_DEVICE_1) and
FAIRLY_INEVITABLY_A_PUSH(GETVALUE_2_DEVICE_2, PUSH_2_DEVICE_2)
)
As expected, this property holds for the model.
5 The Case Study Reloaded: On Structural
Reconfigurations
As seen so far, the HyperManager acts as a monitoring application with two styles
of communication: pull and push. However, it also needs to cope with structural
reconfigurations. This means that at runtime the architecture of the application
can evolve by, say, establishing new bindings and/or removing existing ones.
For GCM applications bind and unbind operations are handled by the com-
ponent owning the client interface that is supposed to be reconfigurable. This
should come as no surprise, indeed, it follows the same spirit as in object-oriented
languages: an object holds the reference to a target object; it is this object that
must change the reference it holds.
In our case-study, these reconfigurations can occur both at the server level
— when pulling data from the bound gateways —, and at gateway level —
when pushing data to the server. The difference lies at the fact that the server
communicates via a multicast interface, unlike the gateways that establish a
standard 1-to-1 communication. Therefore, these are dealt in a different manner.
5.1 HM Reconfigurable Gateway
Let us first illustrate how a singleton client reconfigurable interface is modelled
in pNets. As depicted by Figure 12, for each client reconfigurable interface there
exists a binding controller.
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Primitive with Binding Controller
M
Queue
!Q m(f, t, arg)
[t=S1.Itf] Q m(f, arg)
[t=S2.Itf´] Q m(f, arg)
Body
!Q m(f, arg)
!Bound(t)
Error(”unbound”)
BCItfj
!Unbound !Bound(t)
?Unbind
Call m*(...)
!Unbound
Bind Itfj(t)
S2
S1
?Q Bind Itfj(t)
?Q Unbind Itfj
!Q m(f, arg)
Serve * Unbind Itfj
?Bind(t)
Fig. 12. Binding controller
Indeed, we allow for reconfigurations by defining two new request messages
for the binding and unbinding of interfaces. These are delegated to a binding
controller that upon method invocation over these reconfigurable interfaces will
check if they are indeed bound, emitting an error if it is not the case. Moreover,
the target of the invocation is decided by checking its passed reference. For this
reason one must know statically what are the possible target interfaces that a
reconfigurable interface can be bound too.
In practice, to the HM Gateway model discussed in Subsection 4.1 we add
the request messages Q Bind ServerMethod and Q Unbind ServerMethod. Since
we only have one reconfigurable interface we can avoid adding an explicit pa-
rameter — unlike shown in Figure 12, where we demonstrate a more general
case. Moreover, since the gateways can only be bound to one target — the
server — the binding controller only needs to keep a state variable regarding its
connectedness.
As expected, these changes have a considerable impact in the size of the
model. This is illustrated by Table 4.
States Transitions File Size
hmgateway-reconfig.bcg 354.252.868 4.178.400.886 ∼ 8.45 gb
hmgateway-reconfig-min.bcg 354.104.012 4.176.956.686 ∼ 8.54 gb
Table 4. Gateway with reconfigurable interface
All the properties proven in Subsection 4.1 still hold for this new HM Gateway
model, with a natural overhead in model-checking them in a much bigger state-
space. However, for this new model we are more interested in addressing the
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reconfiguration capabilities. For instance, provided that the interface is bound,
it will not yield an Unbound action upon method invocation.
Property 6.
< true* . "Q_Bind_ServerMethod" . (not "Q_Unbind_ServerMethod")* .
"Q_ServerMethod" . (not "Q_Unbind_ServerMethod")* . "Unbound" > true
The above property is proved false. This indicates that provided that the inter-
face is bound, a path yielding an Unbound action without the occurrence of a
Q Unbind ServerMethod will not occur.
5.2 HM Reconfigurable Server
As an illustrative example, the pNet of a primitive component featuring a re-
configurable client multicast interface and two service methods — m1 and m2 —
is depicted by Figure 13.
Multicast Example
GrPM m1
GrPM m2
Method m
GrProxy m1[p]
New m1(p)
New m2(p)
!R m(f, val)
GetProxy m1
GetProxy m2
?R m1((p, id), val)
?R m2((p, id), val)
!R m(val)
?Q Unbind Itfj(t)
?Q m(f, arg)
?Q Bind Itfj(t)
Bind Itfj(t)
Unbind Itfj(t)
!Q m1(p, arg)
!Q m2(p, arg)
!Q m1(p,G, arg)
!Q m2(p,G, arg)
GrProxy m2[p]
!MC(G)
New m1(p,G)
New m2(p,G)
Recycle m2(p)
Recycle m1(p)
∀m in {m1,m2}
WaitN m(p, n)
R WaitN m(p, vect)
GetNth m(p, n, val)
GetValue m(p, vect)
Serve unbind Itfj(t)
Serve bind Itfj(t)
Serve m(f, arg)
Itfj Itfj
Body
Queue
!Call m(arg)
Fig. 13. pNet example for reconfigurable multicast interface
In short, the machinery involved for dealing with this kind of interfaces mainly
differs from reconfigurable singleton interfaces in that we must keep track of the
target’s connectedness status. Indeed, the emission of a new proxy— New mi,i∈{1,2}
— is synchronized in a similar manner, however we also transmit the current
status of the multicast interface (i.e. the G variable in the figure). This status will
be taken into account when invoking one of the client methods — Q mi,i∈{1,2}.
In practice, G is a boolean vector whose element’s valuation determine the in-
terface’s connectedness.
Table 5 demonstrates the impact of adding reconfiguration capabilities to the
HM Server model.
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States Transitions File Size
hmserver-reconfig.bcg 931.640.080 16.435.355.306 ∼ 32.93 gb
Table 5. Server with reconfigurable multicast interface
The generated state-space for the HM Server model nearly attained 1 billion
states.9 Our attempts to minimize it revealed to be unsuccessful due to the lack
of memory. These were carried out on a workstation with ∼90 GB of RAM.
It is worth noticing that while we were not able to minimize the produced
state-space, we were still able to model-check it against the same properties
discussed in Subsection 4.2.
5.3 Model Generation and Proven Properties
As seen in Subsection 4.3, building the product of the system already showed to
be delicate. Abstraction techniques such as communication hiding were already
required to build the system. Thus, it should come as no surprise that we face
the same situation here.
However, it should be noted that the hiding process itself, produced little
effect on the file size, and no effect on the state-spaces. It mainly acted as a means
to leverage the subsequent minimization process, allowing for a very significant
state-space reduction. Table 6 illustrates the results obtained by following the
same approach as above.
States Transitions File Size
hmgateway-reconfig-min-w-hidden.bcg 354.104.012 4.176.956.686 ∼ 8.15 gb
hmgateway-reconfig-min-w-hidden-min.bcg 11.090.974 127.799.874 ∼ 283.5 mb
hmserver-reconfig-min-w-hidden.bcg 931.640.080 16.435.355.306 ∼ 31.28 gb
Table 6. Relevant numbers regarding the generated model with reconfigurable inter-
faces
We obtained a significant state-space reduction for the HM Gateway model,
but we were unable to minimize the HM Server. Indeed, communication hiding
may leverage state-space reduction, but still requires that the minimization pro-
cess is able to run, therefore not solving the lack of memory issue. This is a rather
9 As mentioned in Subsection 4.2, for the HM Server model, the JMX Indicators com-
ponent is generated with a context not including the request of device statuses. Pre-
vious experiments not considering this context produced a HM Server model with
the following characteristics: 4.148.563.680 states, with 74.268.977.628 transitions,
on a 154.2 GB file. It is interesting to note the huge impact that (the lack of) a
contextual state-space generation on one of its components can provoke.
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embarrassing situation as we would expect a significant state-space reduction as
well for the HM Server.
While communication hiding revealed to be a valuable tool, minimization is
still a bottleneck if the input state-space is already too big. Thus, we need to
shift this burden to the lower levels of the hierarchy. Indeed, both HM Server
and HM Gateway components are the result of a product between their primitive
components. Moreover, these are themselves the result of a product between
their internals – request queue, body, proxies ...
Table 7 illustrates the results obtained by hiding the same communication
actions as in the above approaches, but before starting to build any product.
States Transitions File Size
hidden-hmgateway-reconfig.bcg 3.483.000 43.193.346 ∼ 85.46 mb
hidden-hmgateway-reconfig-min.bcg 3.073.108 39.373.968 ∼ 83.95 mb
hidden-hmserver-reconfig.bcg 210.121.904 3.890.791.694 ∼ 7.52 gb
hidden-hmserver-reconfig-min.bcg 177.604.848 3.288.937.718 ∼ 6.61 gb
SystemProduct-reconfig.bcg 3.054.464.649 38.680.270.695 ∼ 74.16 gb
Table 7. Relevant numbers regarding the generated model with reconfigurable inter-
faces
Indeed, following this approach proved to be fruitful as we were able to
generate the system product. Yet, minimization remained still out of reach.
Nevertheless, we are still in a position to model-check some properties of interest.
For instance, pulling information via a multicast emission is now predicated with
a boolean array whose element’s valuation determines its connectedness. As an
example, a rather simple liveness property is the following one:
Property 7.
<true* . "Q_GatewayMulticastMethod !ARRAY(FALSE FALSE) !MemoryUsage"> true
Initially, both HM Gateways are bound, the above property tell us that we can
indeed unbind both of them.
6 Related Work
The maturity attained by the CADP toolbox made it a reference tool among the
formal methods community. Several case studies have been published, namely
industrial ones addressing other goals than verification. For instance, in [8] Coste
et. al. discuss performance evaluation for systems and networks on chips. More
closely related with our work we must refer the experiments presented in [7]. A
dynamic reconfiguration protocol is specified and model-checked, however their
focus is on the reconfiguration protocol itself rather than reconfigurable appli-
cations.
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Indeed, many works can be found in the literature embracing a behavioural
semantics approach for the specification and verification of distributed systems.
Yet, literature addressing the aspects of reconfigurable applications remains
scarce.
Nevertheless, we must cite the work around BIP (Behaviour, Interaction, Pri-
ority) [2] — a framework encompassing rigorous design principles. It allows the
description of the coordination between components in a layered way. Moreover,
it has the particularity of also permitting the generation of code from its models.
Yet, structural reconfigurations are not supported.
Another rather different approach that we must refer is the one followed by
tools specifically tailored for architectural specifications. For instance, in [11]
Inverardi et. al. discusses CHARMY, a framework for designing and validating
architectural specifications. It offers a full featured graphical interface with the
goal of being more user friendly in an industrial context. Still, architectural
specifications remain of static nature.
Looking at the interactive theorem proving arena we can also find some re-
lated material. In [6] Boyer et. al. propose a reconfiguration protocol and prove
its correctness in the Coq Proof Assistant [15]. This work however, focuses on the
protocol itself, and not in the behaviour of a reconfigurable application. More-
over, in [10] we presented Mefresa — a Mechanized Framework for Reasoning
on Software Architectures. This work discusses a formal specification and a
(re)configuration language for GCM architectures. All the involved machinery
and underlying formal semantics are mechanized in Coq. However, at the cur-
rent stage of development its main focus is on the reasoning at the architectural
level.
7 Final Remarks
In the realm of component-based systems, behavioural specification is among
the most employed approaches for the rigorous design of applications. It lever-
ages the use of model-checking techniques, by far the most widespread formal
method in the industry. Yet, verification in the presence of structural reconfig-
urations remains still a rather unaddressed topic. This can be justified by the
inherent complexity that such systems impose. However, reconfiguration plays
a significant role for the increase in systems availability, and is a key ingredient
in the autonomic computing arena, thus tackling its demands should be seen of
paramount importance.
In this paper we discussed the specification and formal verification of a re-
configurable monitoring application as an industrial case study. Several lessons
can be drawn from this work.
The Spinnaker project gave us the opportunity to promote the use of formal
methods within the industry. As expected, the interaction with our industrial
partners revealed to be a demanding task. Common budgetary issues (time allo-
cation, hirings, ...) of such projects and lack of prior formal methods’ exposure
by our partners were some of the barriers to overcome. This was further ag-
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gravated by the fact that software development was playing a little part in the
overall project budget, and therefore not a main priority.
Nevertheless our experience revealed to be fruitful. We were able to witness
the general curiosity on the use of formal methods by the industry, and increase
our understanding on the needs and obstacles for its broader adoption. Indeed,
collaborative projects of this nature allow the industry to test the waters and
expose researchers to real-world scenarios. However, bridging the gap between
the industry’s expectation and the current state of the art still remains as a
challenge for the research community. To this end, recent work on Vercors [12]
aims at bringing intuitive specification languages and graphical tools for the
non-specialists.
Concerning our task at hand, modelling the HyperManager application
upto the intricacies of the middleware led us to a combinatorial explosion in the
number of states. This, is further exasperated by the inclusion of reconfigurable
interfaces. Even the use of compositional and contextual state-space generation
techniques revealed to be insufficient. While this could be solved by further
increasing the available memory in our workstation, it is worth noticing that
this approach is not always feasible in practice. This bottleneck can be alleviated
by performing the synchronization product in a distributed manner. Alas, this
is not supported by the CADP toolbox. Alternatively, CADP supports tau-
reduction algorithms that reduce on-the-fly the existent τ -transitions. While
this approach was successfully applied in [5], its practical effects for this case
study remain as future work.10 Moreover, handling such big state-spaces teaches
us the importance of automation regarding model generation. Indeed, debugging
can be a daunting task due to the inherent complexity and size of the involved
models. Regarding this issue we must refer that we plan on tackling behavioural
specification concerns within the Mefresa framework as future work. This will
leverage the use of deductive reasoning in a usual model-checking context as
demonstrated in [14], and thus relax the burden of dealing with huge state-
spaces.
At last, as usual in the realm of formal verification, we conclude that ab-
straction is the key. Taking advantage of CADP’s facilities for communication
hiding, one can specify actions that need not to be observed for the verification
purposes, which further enhances the effects of a subsequent minimization by
branching bisimulation. This illustrates the pragmatic rationale of formal verifi-
cation by model-checking — the most likely reason behind its acceptance in the
industry.
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